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FOREWORD 
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) conducts 
studies relating t o  problems in a number of  areas of wide concern: energy, food 
and agriculture, human settlements and services, resources and environment, and 
management and technology, as well as analytic techniques required to  address 
problems in these areas. 
This paper discusses how such problems must be approached, and how 
Mr. Tornlinson used this approach to develop the program in the management 
and technology area a t  IIASA during his chairmanship. 
This account is based o n  a talk given a t  the Annual Meeting of the Opera- 
tions Research Society of  the United Kingdom on  7 September 1979. 
ALEC L E E  
Chairman 
Management and Technology Area 
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Doing Something About the Future* 
ROLFE TOMLINSON 
National Coal Board, on secondment as Charrman, Management and Technology Area, 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria 
T h ~ s  paper IS concerned with the need for more interdisciplinary, systems oriented. research directed 
towards major problems encountered by decis~on makers In industry and government; a need which 
1s more difficult lo meet in the face of traditional methods of organ~sing knowledge and research. It 
emphasises the need to acknowledge the true complexity of the problems and the interact~ve nature 
of any effective research procedure. As an ~llustration, both of the need and the problems ~nvolved In 
meetlng it, the development of a new program of research Into problems of Management and 
Technology at  the Internat~onal Institute of Applied Systems Analysis, whrch is supported by seven- 
teen nations of all p o l ~ l ~ c a l  complex~ons, is analysed. The implicatron 1s that we can do  somethll~g 
about the future, but we must be prepared to do. 
THIS paper is one of a series in which the author has explored, from an empirical base,'-.4 
the nature of the process of operational research and systems analysis (ORASA). In 
particular, it is concerned with the need for a more positive attitude towards interdiscip- 
linary systems oriented research. It is also, however, a pihce &occasion, with an impor- 
tant, though perhaps more ephemeral, secondary message. The occasion was the 1979 
Operational Research Society conference, and the secondary message was a sequel- 
rather than a response-to two papers presented by Russ A ~ k o f f s , ~  at the previous year's 
conference. In those papers Ackoff warned that if certain trends--towards computer 
dependence, technique worship and the general acceptance of the mores of hard, discip- 
linary sciencedeveloped in the U.K. as they had elsewhere (and there is evidence of 
such trends) then O.R. would fail to develop as a distinctive contributor towards the 
solution of the major complex problems of society. In short it would degenerate into yet 
another managerial speciality of minor importance. The arguments were not new in 
essence, but they were presented in such a forceful and direct way as to attract wide- 
spread attention. Ackoff was being prophetic, in the best traditions of Hebraic prophesy, 
and was prophesying doom. a doom which he hoped would yet be averted. 
I believe that the doom which Ackoff and others like him have warned us of will be 
averted; not simply because people will have listened and changed their ways, but 
because the prophets have misread the signs. They have taken their evidence from what 
has been presented to them-largely in the form of papers and books; in the U.K. at 
least this is a small part of the truth. The reality of ORASA is not incarcerated in 
print-it is a living activity, mostly undertaken by in-house teams working in industrial, 
business and governmental organisations. A paper by Tobin,' given at the conference, 
showed how the prophetic view was a travesty of the reality so far as his own team was 
concerned. Many others could have done sc-I wish they had. 
Even if the true state of affairs had been reported, the prophets would not necessarily 
have listened. In truth, it is not easy to explain exactly how the subject is developing in 
those places where it is most successful. I have for some years been puzzled by the 
reaction of some colleagues from other countries when I have described the relationship, 
as I had experienced it, between management in the National Coal Board and the O.R. 
scientists. (It is not so different from that in most successful teams in the U.K.). I thought 
at first that the reaction was that of polite disbelief, but I now see it as being nearer to 
incomprehension. The kind of "action research" relationship which we have been devel- 
oping over the years, and which is so well described by Hylton Boothroyd,' is both 
puzzling and unscientific to those whose thought is still dominated by the "specialist/ 
consultant" paradigm. When you look below the surface, some of the work going on in 
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in-house groups is as excitingly innovative ;is that in Ackoll's Social Systems Science 
team in Pennsylvania. 
This does not mean that things are perfect, nor that the subject or its practitioners can 
stand still. Even if they were perfect IIOW, we would have to change to meet the cl~allenge 
of a very different future. We would still have to d o  something about the future. That is 
the prime message of this paper. But the secondary message is that we can do so  on the 
basis of pride and confidence in some rather exceptional achievements so  Tar. We have no 
cause for dtsmay or shame. 
This paper then is concerned with doing something about the future. Before, however, 
we explore the question of whur to do, we must say something about objectives. Let us 
start with an  obvious statement, namely that the world within which we operate is 
extreme/! complex. In order to start to understand it we have tried to split it up  into 
marly fields of knowledge. Great progress in understanding has been made in some of 
these fields, but even so we do  not even pretend to have a comprehensive understanding 
of how the physical world, let alone Society, works Those who adopt a less reductionist 
approach.-the theologians and philosophers-have not made too much progress either. 
They have certainly not been able to reduce our understanding of the world and its social 
organisations to a few simple rules or paradigms. 
Now operational research. which is concerned with scientific intervention in this 
complex world, inevitably shares in the same degree of complexity. Why then d o  people 
think that they can describe operational research in terms of one simple paradigm or  a 
small number of simple rules'! There is no one paradigm for the forward development of 
operational research. Thcre are no  few simple principles that will adequately describe 
what we are trying to do. If ever there were-the subject would already be dead. We 
must accept the complexity of life. There are many ways forward, and we must refute any 
prophet who says that there is only one way. 
Nevertheless many have felt the need to define our subject in simple terms; the 
attempts to d o  so  abound in the literature. I have recently suggested4 that any true 
understanding must be built on  an acceptance that any set of definitions that we might 
lay down are necessarily imperfect--there are always exceptions to such rules. At the best 
we can only define "near" truths. But I also pointed out that if these near truths are taken 
as literal truths, they turn out not to be truths at all, but lies. And, since the most 
dangerous lies convince because they seem to be true, these near truths can easily turn 
into lies, very dangerous lies. In this sense, Ackoff may be said to have at the best put 
forward a "near" truth, and we are in danger of replying to him in like manner, with a 
dangerous lie. We must seek a way forward. but not down the road of oversimplification. 
Perhaps the most dangerous simplification of all is the belief that one can draw a neat 
boundary round the subject, isolate ourselves from other thinkers and specialists, and 
develop a future on our own. We cannot. Such an  idea denies the relationship we have 
deveIoped in those teams where we have been most successful- -since our successful work 
has been fundamentally Interactive and cooperative. I would suggest that i f  w e g o  for- 
ward we can only do  so with others, and that the time has come for us to rethink our 
position in relation to what can best be described as the interdisciplinary systems move- 
ment. The best way to explain this is to draw on my recent experience at the Inter- 
national Institute for AppIied Systems Analysis which may be said to he near thc heart of 
this movement. I shall therefore briefly describe the Institute and its programme of work, 
and then discuss some of the problems we have had to overcome there in building up  a 
research programme concerned with Management and Technology and which seem to be 
particularly relevant t o  my theme. 
T H E  INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE F O R  APPLIED 
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
The  Institute was rounded in 1972 after long negotiations starting from tentative pro- 
posals made by Kruschev and Johnson in 1966. The background idea was that, i f  detente 
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were to mean anything, we should work together on some of the common problems that 
we shared. It is perhaps worth mentioning that one of the main problems in setting up 
the Institute was in deciding on a name. It was agreed that the Institute should be 
studying the complex decision problems. both global and universal, facing our highly 
developed societies. The British thought that Operational Research was the right title- 
but elsewhere it often had such a narrow connotation that it was unacceptable. In the 
end, Applied Systems Analysis proved to be an acceptable phrase. (It has been suggested 
since the phrase was undefined, nobody could disagree with it). 
The Institute now has 17 member countries from East and West Europe, North 
America and Japan. The U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. are the major partners, each providing 
just over a quarter of the subscribed income and of the scientific staff. The other I5 
countries are equal members both in their financial contributions and numbers of staff. 
(The average is about three scientists per member country, other than U.S.A. and 
U.S.S.R.). 
Possibly the most important of all the decisions made in the initial negotiations was 
that IlASA should be a non-Governmental Institute. Non-Governmental means, quite 
simply, that the controlling Council does not consists of Government appointees, but 
rather representatives of the Academy of Sciences in the country concerned, or where this 
was not appropriate, of some specially-constituted scientific committee of equal status. 
Tbus the Council member for the United Kingdom is currently the Treasurer of the 
Royal Society. This has turned out to be one of our greatest strengths because these 
bodies, whilst being influential, are extremely jealous of their independence and of their 
scientific reputation. This has relieved the Institute of many of the bureaucractic press- 
ures that arise in governmental international organisations-for example, no scientific 
posts are earmarked for any one country. Currently, there are 75 scientists paid for out of 
the subscriptions of member countries; and about 20 scientists supported from other 
funds. The total budget at the moment is about $10 million. 
The Institute currently has six main research fields: Energy; Food and Agriculture: 
Resources and Environment, Human Settlements and Services; Management and Tech- 
nology; and Systems and Decision Sciences. There is also work on Regional Develop- 
ment, and a major publishing programme. 
Since no national Institutes of Applied Systems Analysis existed when IIASA was set 
up, it had to start from the beginning in deciding what work it could usefully undertake, 
and what its detailed objectives would be. This was particularly true in the Management 
and Technology Area, where the programme has been shaped only over the past two 
years. There are at least two good reasons for IIASA to have a research Area with this 
title. One is that an Institute of Applied Systems Analysis should be concerned with 
application. Applications occur only when one makes contact with those concerned in 
decision processes, and appropriate decisions are taken. Consequently. the overall team 
needs to contain people experienced in the interface between analysis and management, 
who know something about management and management processes. Secondly, if the 
Institute is concerned with the problems of the developed world. they must be aware that 
many of these problems, if not most of them, arise from or are accentuated by changes in 
technology or the problem of managing technology itself. So a programme in Manage- 
ment and Technology makes sense in principle; the question was to decide what it could 
be in practice. Three of the issues that we had to think through are of particular rele- 
vance to the general theme of this paper. and I shall therefore discuss them in turn. 
WHAT IS 'APPLIED"? 
One of the most important things we have had to think through is what we mean by 
"applied". This may appear to be an absurd question, but in a recent job application a 
candidate referred to "Used Mathematics" as one of his college subjects. (He might. I 
suppose, have said "second-hand", which raises the delightful image of salesmen selling 
mathematics as they do cars.) The point of this story is that in the context of mathemat- 
Journal of the Operational Research Society Vol. 31, No. 6 
ics, "applied does not necessarily mean "used". I studied at a University where applied 
mathematics is called "Natural Philosophy" and is only "applied" in the sense that it is 
concerned with the development of mathematical models of some physical reality. Some- 
times the models may not be very exact, or it may be impossible to solve them exactly- 
but, in general, the understanding that is generated through the mathematical process is 
what matters. Some of our work at IIASA is applied only in this special sense. We are 
developing models which enable us to try and understand how complex, interrelated 
systems behave. We bring together a variety of methodological and technological experi- 
ence from many countries; and then try to develop together, in conjunction with policy- 
makers, an understanding of the behaviour of these particular kinds of complex systems. 
If we can achieve understanding, then that is a very real "applied" result. 
(An aside may be of interest here. There is, and always has been, criticism of University 
courses in O.R. because they contained too much mathematics, which the students never 
subsequently used in practice. Now, if the only reason for teaching mathematical tech- 
niques is in order to enable people to undertake more elaborate calculations, then we 
probably do teach too much mathematics. On the other hand, it could equally be argued 
that the most important thing that you learn from Queueing Theory is not the method of 
solving the mathematics but an understanding of how queues behave. You can explore 
things using theory, and thus develop understanding, that you cannot in real life or even 
when using simulations. The same may be said with other mathematical formulations. 
The question thus moves from whether mathematics should be extensively taught to why, 
i.e. what the lecturer sets out to achieve. Is the time to be spent on teaching people 
methods of manipulation, or in giving them an understanding of how systems actually 
behave. If it is the latter, then the mathematical input may be justified.) 
Having said this, in the subject area of Management and Technology we are primarily 
concerned, though not exclusively so, about doing work whose results can be "used. 
Certainly, the Council of the Institute are defining "applied" in this traditional manner. 
But if one accepts this definition of "applied", the very location of the Institute creates 
great difficulties. Vienna is after all, remotely located so far as most points of use in the 
national member countries are concerned. In fact, if you think about it, it is absurd to 
think that the Institute's work could. except in rare cases, be of direct use to policy- 
makers or decision-makers. Rather it is the policy advisers that we can hope to h e l p  
those actively in touch with the decision process who themselves are undertaking analy- 
sis, often with inadequate information and techniques. But before we proceed with this 
discussion, it is necessary to rehearse the way in thich O.R. and systems analysis really do 
make an impact on the decision-making process. 
The traditional description of how the analyst helps management is illustrated in 
Figure 1. "There is an initial meeting between the manager and the analyst at which the 
symptoms which concern the manager are converted into a problem that the analyst 
thinks he can solve. (This meeting may, of course, become a dialogue over several 
meetings.) The analyst then takes the problem away, solves it, and proposes an imple- 
mentable form of the solution to the manager. Who, of course, accepts it". This tra- 
ditional description bears little relation to reality-for many reasons. Perhaps the most 
important reason is that it assumes that the problem remains unaltered-whether in 
reality or in the manager's perception. Even at this simplistic level, the true picture would 
Management 
Analysis 
FIG. I 
470 
Rolje Tomlinson-Doing Something About the Future 
M E N  --c. 
FlxKmL-. 
II 
Analysis 
be more like Figure 2. In fact, in the elapsed time both the managers' and analysts' 
perceptions are likely to alter, with the consequences that the analyst's solution is not 
relevant to the problem perceived by the manager. 
Of course if you talk to any successful O.R. group you will find that these simplistic 
~deas  do not bear any relation to what actually happens. The effective group behaves in 
the manner indicated by Figure 3-in that the management process and the analytical 
process are continually overlapping all the time. The analysts, the ORASA* team, are not 
remote people that come in, talk to someone, take away the problem, and go back. They 
are there. They are part of the management team. Our "pure" scientific colleagues may 
enquire about what this does to objectivity-without usually very strong philosophical 
grounds for doing s-but it is the very heart of genuine implementation, or, as Booth- 
royd has described it, articulate intervention. The heart of all this is to understand that 
we are concerned with "processm-with the management process, the analytical process 
and their interaction. You may talk of problem identification, re-identification, re-re- 
identification-i.e. try to talk of it all as an incremental process. But we shall probably 
understand it all far better if we think in terms of continuous processes-if only because 
this forces us into a different mould of thought and makes us develop different kinds of 
models. 
Now if these criticisms of the classical description of managementlanalyst interaction 
are valid, they have major implications with regard to the way in which a Research 
Institute can operate. The classical analogue would be as in Figure 4. It is an approach 
that might be valid for an Institute of Mathematics or Economics or Social Science, but 
certainly not for an Institute of Applied Systems Analysis. There are two reasons for this. 
One is that it ignores the continuity of interaction necessary for the effective solution 
of a systems problem. The other is that it separates the Institute from the real problem 
-which is always fatal in 'applied' work. In practice, following the Venn diagram of 
Figure 3 we may have two effective modes of operation (Figure 5(a) and (b)). In 5(a) 
management originally deal directly with the Research Institute which, as the solution 
develops, increasingly involves the analysts. This is a common mode and one which is 
often adopted by University based research teams. For organ~sational reasons it would 
be a difficult one to adopt at IIASA. But there are, in addition, some fundamental 
objections, particularly with regard to the 'inferior' position imposed on the analyst. I 
prefer the alternative approach, whereby the major management interaction remains with 
the analyst on the spot, and the researcher becomes an extension of his team, having 
* Because it is impossible for me to make a distinction, in theory or practice, between Operational Research 
and Applied Systems Analys~s 1 shall. from this point on use the abbreviation ORASA. 
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direct contact with management but within that framework. There is a double lesson 
here. Not only is this the only satisfactory way for us to operate in the long run, there are 
also implications for our 'customers', whether in Government, or in industry. Unless 
there is a strong group of people in the organisation already in contact with management 
who are able to absorb the ideas of the research group and apply them in the new 
situation, application will be almost impossible. I believe very strongly that the key to 
effective use by management of ORASA is in the existence of a strong 'in-house' ORASA 
type activity. We cannot substitute thut relationship from an international Research 
Institute. 
I have placed these, and subsequent remarks, in the llASA context quite deliberately 
-it is necessary that you should understand our problems as well as our strengths. But 
do not miss the general import of what I have been saying. I have made some I'undamen- 
tal assertions about effective ORASA and the management.'analyst relationship. I have 
also made some rather fundamental statements which are relevant to the role of the O.R. 
consultant and to the shape and organisation of O.R. research. I shall return to all these 
issues at a later stage. 
WHAT KIND O F  RESEARCH? 
This is not a question with an obvious answer. When I first discussed the question of an 
Institute of O.R. Research some years ago1 I got warm support for the idea, but few 
positive suggestions as to what we should do. I subsequently conceived the idea that the 
information was there. but I was simply not asking the right questions. If you talked to 
successful O.R. managers you found that there were many problems that they were 
unable to tackle. Sometimes this was for organisational reasons or questions of internal 
politics. Quite often it was because the means were not yet available to thern and that it 
was too big an investment for any one organisation to try and break the new ground on 
its own. So, one way of answering the question was to turn it on myself. As a result of 
this approach, 1 eventually identified six major problem areas where ORASA ought to be 
able to make a substantial impact, whcre currently the advice available to management 
was inadequate. These were as follows: 
( t r )  The munayement of complex programmes 
The management of a complex programme, whether we consider the construction of a 
complex plant or a regional development programme, would be a relatively straightfor- 
ward question if it could be considered as a static operation. But it is not. Failures to 
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complete elements of the programme on time provide the smallest difficulties. Changes in 
assumptions, new information, changed organisation, etc., etc. all lead to situations where 
O.K. and systems analysis prove much less effective than one might have hoped. It 
should be possible to improve our effectiveness, but how'? 
(b) I~~l~ocutiotr 
The ~nnovation problem is difficult in all industries. In the National Coal Board, we 
have been looking Ibr years to see where the next great technological breakthrough was 
coming from, and how we could best develop existing ideas to general implementation. 
Other industries pave similar problems. But national governments are concerned as well. 
The need for more and better analysis seemed quite universal. 
(c) The problem o~.sctrle 
Once more I started with my own experience. One of the earliest decisions made in the 
process of planning a new colliery was its size, but the methodology for doing this did 
not appear to be adequate. Then I noticed that this was a unive~.sal problem. All around 
you find mistakes on scale--from hospitals to electricity generating units. At the 
moment, the mistakes of being too big are the most eye-catching. but mistakes in the 
other direction are probably as frequent. Surprisingly no standard method of approach- 
ing such problems is available which puts together at that time the work of the econom- 
ists. the technologists and the sociologists. 
(d) Monlcomputer irltcroction 
Computers have been around for a long time, but microelectronics are transforming 
the situation again. Up to the present the computer has had little effect on the discretion- 
ary work of management. It provides more (or sometimes Iess!) information; it under- 
takes elaborate calculations; but management behaviour is hardly altered. The question 
is whether that situation will alter when computers, and information storage, are so 
cheap that every manager can have his own data bank-with his own clerk undertaking 
calculations at his bidding. It could cause a managerial revolution, with major conse- 
quences for training and organisatlon. What will the constraints be in the new situation? 
(e) Value und risk 
Decision-making under uncertainty has, for many years, been a familiar phrase in the 
O.R. world. When, however. one looks at the methods availab~e they are of rather limited 
application. We have little idea how to evaluate risk or incorporate qualitative value 
judgements into the analysis--and this leaves the way open to others who are not afraid 
to venture into difficult waters. even though their available tools are little better for- 
med---if at all. When it comes to the processes involved in coping with the negotiations 
involved in planning and managing potentially dangerous technological activities the 
situation becomes really dificult. 
(f) hlatri~gementlc~nalyfl interface 
How can we develop our understanding of the processes by which change is induced in 
organisations'? 
That is one list, which I was forced to prepare in development of the Management and 
Technology Area at IIASA. But if ORASA as a subject is to d e v e l o p b y  which I mean 
tackling more and more difficult problems. not simply being cleverer at the old ones-we 
all ought to have a similar list and we ought to be pushing it towards our research 
colleagues. Do not blame the universities for not tackling the right problems unless you 
are willing to say what they are and have expressed a willingness to help them undertake 
the necessary work. 
Returning to IIASA. The list of six research topics has stood the test of time, and 
remains the basis of the current MMT programme which currently includes three major 
research projects, three exploratory studies, and two industry studies. 
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The first project of major research is in the field of Innovation, where we are looking at 
three main questions: (1) How does a government decide on the best technological areas 
to encourage innovation? (2) How does it achieve the sort of changes it wants--what 
instruments are available to it, and how effective are they? (3) Within the firm or 
industry, what are the factors encouraging or preventing innovation'? 
The second main problem towards which substantial research effort is directed is the 
problem of scale. We have had a recent conference, which will be reported on in 1980, 
which was the first time that technologists, economists and social scientists have been 
able to get together and talk about the topic. It was a lively debate right through to the 
end, and it was clear that no general approach was yet in sight. We will study particular 
problems of scale in different industries, and are thinking in terms of a handbook. 
The third main research topic is the management of high risk situations. We have done 
previous work looking at the institutional and organisational problems associated with 
the Bravo oil blowout in the North Sea. We are currently organising a conference on 
institutional problems that arise in the contingency planning related to nuclear reactor 
safety. We are starting work on similar problems related to LNG and LPG plants. 
Overall we see this work in the wider context mentioned above, and have confidence in 
developing a major activity. 
I shall not refer to all of the exploratory studies in detail. One is concerned with the 
impact of small scale computer systems on management, one with the use of operational 
gaming as an aid to policy-making, and one with aspects of the management of major 
regional programmes. To complete the picture we have also initiated some industry 
studies under the general title "Issues for the Eighties". These are collaborative research 
studies with representatives from one industry in the many countries involved in IIASA. 
The first two industries are coal and forestry. 
It is too early to draw particular conclusions from the work itself, which has only just 
started, but there are certain general conclusions that can be drawn immediately. In the 
first place the establishment of research like this takes time. It is 2 years since the 
planning was begun, and it is only now that a full team has been established, working 
together and making real progress. Secondly, there seems to be a very general recogni- 
tion of the fact that these topics are important and need research; so I am encouraged 
that the search process of identifying gaps in our analytical abilities was on the right 
lines. Finally, I find that although the projects chosen seem quite distinct, it is in fact 
almost impossible to keep them apart. They all lie close to the heart of management 
uncertainty at the present time, and they interact all the way. It is impossible, and even 
absurd, to tackle individual management problems in isolation. The moment we try to 
do this we are lost. 
W H O  DOES IT? 
A determination to go forward, combined with an understanding of where and how to 
go, leave you exactly where you are unless you have the people to do the work. What 
kind or people are needed [or such research? When we try to answer these questions in 
the IIASA context, there are certain background constraints which we have to consider. 
One of these is the fact that most people come to IIASA for one or two-year second- 
ments (although we are trying to get more people to stay for longer). This has a major 
impact on project planning, bearing in mind the fact that no researcher will exactly 
follow the path of the person he succeeds, even if he comes from the same country and 
has the same scientific training! Secondly, it is necessary to realise that a move to Vienna 
is a major upheaval in the life of the scientist concerned, and of his family, and is only 
possible at certain moments in a person's career. To find the right persons, at the right 
time in their career and at the right time for their family is a major task. Finally, we find 
that not all people with the right qualifications fit into the IIASA environment. So our 
recruitment lead times are long and have a high variance, with always a finite possibility 
of 'non-appearance'. It makes team-building a nightmare. Even so, there are fundamental 
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questions to be answered. For example, what kind of skills are we looking for? When I 
went to IIASA, I was quite clear that what I wanted was more operational research 
people, as we understood the phrase in the U.K. (And I was aware that Operations 
Research was something quite different, and that many other countries would use differ- 
ent names for the same thing.) The team that has now been assembled does not match 
that belief. The following is a list of all research staff who have worked for a period of a 
month or more in the Management and Technology Area during 1979-giving their 
nationality and academic discipline. They are: 
Management Sc~entist 
Control Engineer 
Psych~atrist 
Scientific Administrator 
Control Engineer 
Decision Analyst 
Explosions Chemist 
Engineer 
Social Psychologist 
Mathematician 
O.R. Man 
2 Economists 
Systems Dynarniclst 
Mathematiclan 
Nuclear Englneer 
Space Engineer 
Minlng Engmeer 
Economist 
Health Scientist 
Agr~cultural~st 
Mining Engineer 
Canada 
Japan 
U.S.A. 
U.S.S.R. 
Finland 
U.S.A. 
U.K. 
Sweden 
Netherlands 
U.S.A. 
U.K. 
G.D.R. 
U.S.A. 
Austria 
U.K. 
U.S.A. 
Czechoslovakia 
U.S.A. 
U.S.A. 
Denmark 
Poland 
If you look back through that list, you will find that there is just one management 
scientist, from Canada, and one operational research man, from the U.K. How does this 
link in with what I thought before? 
One reason, as I have said, is that there is no accepted name on a world wide basis to 
describe the kind of problem oriented, cross-disciplinary systems thinker-which is the 
basic characteristic of the traditional operational research person from the U.K.+r as I 
would now say the ORASA analyst. You have to find them where you can. A second 
reason is that we have encountered a need for a genuinely interdisciplinary approach. 
ORASA may be thought of as an interdisciplinary subject, but the analyst cannot be 
expert in all fields of knowledge. If you are breaking into new problem areas, you must 
sometimes reach out to the limits of existing knowledge-i.e. the disciplinary experts 
have to be involved. So, IIASA has taken me back to the origins of operational research. 
One needs disciplinary skills, but must somewhow avoid the restriction on inventive 
thought that these skills usually bring with them. 
So I do not believe that one person (operational researcher, systems analyst, cyberneti- 
cian) can, in himself, be fully interdisciplinary-though I believe more strongly than ever 
in the efficacy of the systems oriented, interdisciplinary approach to real life problem 
solving. (It is no coincidence that many of the most successful scientists at IIASA have 
had two quite different disciplinary careers.) Increasingly, I think that the O.R./systems 
role is to provide the methodological (in the broad, philosophical sense of the word) 
heart to such interdisciplinary studies. This is a traditional role, but one that is too often 
forgotten in our training courses in O.R. I have also discovered again that there are, 
happily, specialists who are able to throw off their disciplinary shackles when they have 
to. (Yet another reason for resisting attempts to make O.R. an "exclusive" profession.) 
This list of people therefore represents a deliberate choice which gives a pointer for 
future thinking on what we do and how we teach it. Operational Researchers and 
Systems Analysts have to start thinking about their claim to be a central and essential 
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part of it. By and large that claim has not yet been accepted, partly because it has not 
been made, partly because too many of the visible members of the community are 
showing all the traditional signs of exclusiveness and reductioniam that is the antithesis 
o n  the systems movement. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, let us come back t o  the title of the talk "Doing Something About the 
Future", hy reiterating four points. 
The  first of these is to point out  that in O.R. in the U.K.  we start off from well 
prepared. firm ground. We have our failures and trauma; we are continually tempted 
down false paths; BUT, we have a proud record of achievement and some very exciting 
things are happening on the ground. It is time we were prepared t o  confound criticism by 
arguing our case in public. A number of our in-house teams have developed a sophisti- 
cated working relationship with managers in their organisations which is incredible to 
those who have learnt about O.R. from the literature. T o o  many people still believe that 
O.R. is an academic subject, undertaken in back rooms and universities. It is certainly 
not yet understood as "articulate interventionw-a cooperative venture with manage- 
ment. And how should it be known in this way if we d o  not tell them! It is worth while 
spending the time t o  write up our practical work-not to claim the millions of pounds 
saved, but to show the methodology, the intellectual excitement, and the systems sophis- 
tication involved. Unless we recognise the solid ground that we stand on, how can we 
persuade anyone else'! 
The  second point is that, in ORASA, going forward is a necessary condition for 
survival. Our  pride in the past gives us the opportunity for the future, but it does not 
secure it. In that sense Ackoti is right. We have to change and adapt if others are not to 
inherit our birthright. We shall have t o  tackle new kinds of problem, and develop the 
methodology to d o  so. I have been trying to urge the need for more positive, concerned, 
thinking in this respect for years. If you want a future you have got to make it. 
Thirdly. the future should not be thought of as a mere extrapolation of the past. W e  
need to think how to be involved in, and encourage, interdisciplinary studies into some 
of the big problems of the kind that we are tackling at IIASA. O u r  concern must not be 
vague and general; not general worries about the energy situation, for example, but 
particular problems facing government and industry for which-for one reason or 
another-little or no  systems work is currently available. We are uniquely experienced in 
handling interdisciplinary problems in our organisations, where we have t o  work with 
every function in the firm or  department. But we are little experienced in the research 
field. We cannot d o  this alone, so  how d o  we collaborate? 
Fourth, if we want to make a collaborative, original future it needs effort as much as 
thought. I can see no  reason why we should not be as influential in raising funds. in 
supporting our good causes, as anyone else. It needs all those things necessary for 
survival; above all, will and determination. W e  have a head start. What are we waiting 
for? 
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